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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
RICKIE L. REBER, 
TEX WILLIAM ATKINS, & 
STEVEN PAUL THUNEHORST, 
Respondents. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
in the interest of: 
C.R. , 
A person under 18 years of age, 
Case No. 20060299-SC 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari to review the decisions of the 
court of appeals in State v. Reber, 2005 UT App 485, 128 P.3d 
1211, and In re C.R., 2005 UT App 486 (unpublished). See addenda 
A & B.1 This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) and § 78-2-2 (5) (West 2004). 
1
 This appeal represents the consolidation of four cases. 
Three cases, each involving a single adult defendant, were 
consolidated by the trial court. See Order at addendum C. The 
fourth case, adjudicating the juvenile son of one of the adult 
defendants, was consolidated upon this Court's own motion in its 
order granting certiorari review. See Order at addendum D. The 
State's record citations refer to the Reber case materials. 
Moreover, for purposes of linguistic flow, the State uses the 
singular form, "defendant," throughout its briefing. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The State of Utah may not exert jurisdiction in Indian 
Country if either the perpetrator of a charged crime or any 
victim is Indian. This guiding principle gives rise to two 
questions for certiorari review. 
1. Does the Ute Indian Tribe have a regulatory interest in 
hunting throughout Indian Country, such that the Tribe is a crime 
victim of any illegal hunting within Indian Country? 
2. Does the Ute Indian Tribe have a property interest in 
wildlife located throughout Indian Country, such that the Tribe 
is a crime victim of any illegal hunting within Indian Country? 
Jurisdictional rulings are reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Nones, 2000 UT App 211, 55, 11 P.3d 709 (citing State Dep't of 
Soc. Servs. v. Viiil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)). Although 
this Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals on 
certiorari, it may review for correctness the legal conclusions 
of both the trial court and the court of appeals. Butterfield v. 
Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
18 U.S.C. § 1151, defining "Indian Country" is located at 
addendum E. 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-3 (West 2004), governing taking or 
transporting protected wildlife, provides in pertinent part: 
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(1) Except as provided in this title or a 
rule, proclamation, or order of the Wildlife 
Board, a person may not: 
(a) take. . . 
(i) protected wildlife or their parts. . . or 
(b) transport . . . protected wildlife or 
their parts. . . or 
(d) possess protected wildlife . . . 
unaccompanied by a valid license, permit, 
[or] tag . . . 
(2) Possession of protected wildlife without 
a valid license, permit, [or] tag . . . is 
prima facie evidence that the protected 
wildlife was illegally taken and is illegally 
held in possession. 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-23 (West 2004), governing aiding or 
assisting, provides: 
It is unlawful for any person to aid or 
assist any other person to violate any 
provisions of this code or any rules or 
regulations promulgated under it. The 
penalty for violating this section is the 
same as for the provision or regulation for 
which aid or assistance is given. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of aiding or assisting 
in the wanton destruction of protected wildlife, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 23-20-4, -23 (West 
2004). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction (R. 12-13). After extensive briefing and hearings 
on jurisdiction and subsidiary issues related to jurisdiction, 
the court denied the motion (R. 359-64). Defendant was then 
tried by a jury, which convicted him as charged (R. 505-06, 564). 
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The court ordered a suspended prison term of zero-to-five years, 
restitution payable to the Utah Department of Wildlife "Stop 
Poaching" Fund in the amount of $4000, a fine of $1250 or 250 
hours of community service, and three years of probation with 
conditions attached (R. 562-65). 
Defendant filed a timely appeal, seeking review of the trial 
court's pre-trial rulings (R. 566-67). The court of appeals 
consolidated defendant's appeal with two other appeals raising 
identical issues. See addendum C. After oral argument, the 
court of appeals vacated the convictions of all three defendants, 
concluding that "the crimes occurred in Indian Country governed 
by the Ute Tribe. Because the Ute Tribe is the victim, the State 
does not have jurisdiction." Reber, 2005 UT App 485, 1 13 at 
addendum A. When the court of appeals denied the State's 
petition for rehearing, the State filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari. Defendant filed a cross-petition. This Court 
granted the petitions as to the two issues raised by the State 
and one issue raised by defendant. The Court further ordered 
that a juvenile court case adjudicating the son of one of the 
defendants also be consolidated into this case. See addendum D. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the 2002 deer hunt, a truck pulled up to a checkpoint 
in Uintah County where the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources 
was checking for chronic wasting disease (R. 584: 157). There 
was a large mule deer buck in the truck bed, but no state hunting 
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permit, license, or tag attached to the animal (Id. at 158). 
Defendant and his son, as well as two other relatives, were in 
the truck (Ld^ at 162). 
Defendant told a conservation officer that his son had shot 
the deer but that he felt responsible for the act (Id. at 164, 
167). The son corroborated that he had killed the deer (Id. at 
165). The conservation officer testified that defendant had 
blood on his hands, and defendant's brother testified that 
defendant had helped load the deer into the truck (Id. at 165, 
180) .2 
Based on this evidence, defendant was convicted, as charged, 
of aiding or assisting in the wanton destruction of wildlife (R. 
2-3, 545-48).3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The crime in this case was committed in Uintah County on 
land that is also Indian Country. Criminal jurisdiction over 
crimes committed in Indian Country turns on the Indian or non-
2
 These facts document the charge against defendant Reber. 
His son, C.R. was charged by petition in juvenile court with 
wanton destruction of wildlife. Defendants Thunehorst and Atkins 
were each charged with aiding or assisting in the wanton 
destruction of wildlife, a class A misdemeanor, for poaching deer 
in the National Forest in northwestern Uintah County within 
Indian Country (R. 363-64). 
3
 In contrast to the other adult defendants, Reber was 
charged with a third degree felony because the animal was a 
trophy deer, statutorily defined as "any buck with an outside 
antler measurement of 24 inches or greater." Utah Code Ann. § 23-
13-2(46) (a) (West 2004). The parties stipulated to the size of 
the antler spread (R. 584: 165-66). 
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Indian status of the defendant and the victim, if there is one. 
The State has jurisdiction only if both the defendant and any 
victim are non-Indian. The court of appeals determined that the 
State did not have jurisdiction because the Ute Indian Tribe was 
the victim of defendant's unlawful hunting by virtue of its 
regulatory interest. This conclusion is incorrect for two 
reasons. 
First, the Ute Indian Tribe is not the victim for purposes 
of determining criminal jurisdiction because it does not have an 
unfettered regulatory interest in all hunting on all land within 
"Indian Country." Its regulatory interest does not encompass 
non-Indian hunting on non-Indian lands within Indian Country. 
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). While the crime 
in this case was committed in Indian Country, no record evidence 
suggests that it was committed on Indian lands, which are lands 
owned or held in trust for an Indian tribe or an individual 
Indian. Because the Tribe's regulatory authority does not extend 
to non-Indian hunting on non-Indian lands, the tribe lacked 
regulatory authority over the hunting in this case. Lacking such 
authority, the Tribe is not the victim and jurisdiction properly 
lies with the State. 
Second, the Ute Indian Tribe is not a victim by virtue of a 
property interest in the wildlife. The United States Supreme 
Court has soundly rejected the concept of ownership of wild 
animals, deeming it a legal fiction. "Ownership" of wild animals 
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refers not to any proprietary concept of private ownership b.:t *: •• 
the sovereign/s capacity, In t:x ust for the communal benefit c f 
a ] 1 1:1: i e p e o p 1 e a n d pursuant t o its pOj.-i.c-? powers', t o regulate 1 I o w 
wi Id 1 i f e i s managed. See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Tr.c . 4 31 
OL'-IU. J L..-J ~L-L-„'j .a^ /.s a proprietary 
interest In wildlife on the hoof, it is imt a victim. • , 
'- • -" -.,, •> • 111 i 111 1 i m
 t i • I 1111 < A i IJ \ b i 11 I 11 i ' i i i i , ' i , I 11 L J > C o u r t • •. 
should reverse the court of appeals' ruling that the State lacked 
! * i, I rjus.* Mi "t I l, I i in, Till • '.' i , I l,< • \ i I L 
defendant's illegal hunting on non-Indian land within ]nd:an 
Country. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
.'he parties agree that the land on vTU"i~h ^he crime occurred 
was Indian Country. Under established principles or ire'-
. . : Jii.juLion over crimes committ-u in Indian Cour. = .:y 
depends upon the Indian nr v.< -n- r.ndi an status ri r ^b0 perpetrator 
•:-•••- boiem \ . aartlett, ^cb U c , 
463, 465 n. '/. 1984), The State has jurisdiction over crimes that 
victim of the crime is Indian, then the federa.i r tribal courts 
will have jurisdictl --r :;.•.
 :: ; ; . : , Americai i 
Indian Law, 180-81 (41:1 :i ed. 2004) (chart at addendum G) , l 
:1:
 Underlying all determinations ui j unsaicuion ror crimes 
committed in Indian Country is the nature of the relationship 
between the federal government and federally-recognized Indian 
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Following extensive pre-trial briefing and argument, the 
trial court in this case determined that the State had 
jurisdiction because defendant was not Indian (R. 261-65 at 
addendum G; R. 360-64 at addendum H) .5 The parties below did not 
focus on, nor did the trial court rule on, whether the unlawful 
taking of a deer involved a victim. On appeal, however, the 
court of appeals found this issue dispositive. It determined 
that the Ute Tribe was the victim of defendant's illegal hunting 
tribes. That is, federal "regulation is rooted in the unique 
status of Indians as *a separate people' with their own political 
institutions. Federal regulation of Indian tribes, therefore, is 
governance of once-sovereign political communities." United 
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977). Thus, w u vin 
dealing with Indians the Federal Government is dealing primarily 
not with a particular race as such but with members of certain 
social-political groups towards which the Federal Government has 
assumed special responsibilities."'" LaPier v. McCormick, 986 
F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1993)(quoting United States v. Heath, 509 
F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted)). 
The federal government assumes these "special 
responsibilities" only under specific circumstances. For 
example, where either the perpetrator or victim of a crime 
committed in Indian Country meets the legal definition of Indian, 
the federal interest in the crime and its consequences would 
mandate federal jurisdiction and preclude state jurisdiction. 
See St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1459 (D.S.D. 
1988) (citing D. Getches &' C. Wilkinson, Federal Indian Law 412-
15 (2d ed. 1986)). The State, in turn, exercises criminal 
jurisdiction for crimes committed in Indian Country only when 
Indian interests, which would implicate a federal responsibility, 
are absent. See State v. Sorkhabi, 46 P.3d 1071, 1073 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2002) (state's jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian 
Country by non-Indians in victimless crimes or against non-
Indians "is based on the fact that ^such crimes do not involve 
essential tribal relations or affect the rights of 
Indians'")(citation omitted). 
5
 Moreover, at sentencing, the court ordered that defendant 
pay restitution to the Utah Department of Wildlife Resources 
"Stop Poaching Fund" (R. 563). 
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and that, accordingly, the State lacked jurisdiction, Having ... 
thus resolved the ji irisdicti onal question,' the court of appeals 
did not address whether defendant was Indian, leaving untouched 
the trial.court/s determination that he was not. 
POINT ONE 
THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE IS NOT A. CRIME •• 
VICTIM FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING 
JURISDICTION, BECAUSE IT DOES NOT 
HAVE AN UNFETTERED REGULATORY 
INTEREST IN HUNTING THROUGHOUT 
vx
 INDIAN COUNTRY"; WHEN, AS HERE, A 
NON-INDIAN ILLEGALLY HUNTS ON NON-
INDIAN LAND IN "INDIAN COUNTRY," 
THE TRIBE HAS NO REGULATORY 
INTEREST AND, THEREFORE, CANNOT BE 
THE CRIME VT^TiM 
The court of appedis held that the Ftate lacked jurisdiction 
to prosecute defendant for poaching b — nr. •-» • ' — e 
was trie crime victim. The court reasoned chat t..ne Tribe v^as the 
victim because 1.L had regulatory ^u^hority over all huntir ; 
o: : ,; _:-__•_;:: : ng anywhere wi.u ..i-i ..- 'ountry. See State v, 
Reber, 2005 ' "i" App 485, Hj'l i M<- unlawf^'1 Vi \ ' i^a ^f 3 deer in 
1. J . ; :.;je uy . wterlermg ^iLh its 
regulatory authority. Id, at 11 9- 11. T1 Ie conc 1 usIon that the 
I J t e T r i b e w a s 1:1: I e " ; :ii :: t :i n: t. 1: ;  , :i r 1 1 I ! E; • : • f :i i I j i i :i :;; * t: • : :i !:  s r e g u 1 a t o r y 
authority over all of Indian Country is incorrect because i 1: 
fails to recognize that 1:he Ir:i 1: • e' s aI L 1:hc :i ::i ty : • = J : 1 Ii 11 I 1:i i I :j a i I• :i 
fishinq in Indian Country Is i Iot unfettered. Moreover, i t is 
directly contrary to settled United States Si lprerne Coi ir t 
precedent. 
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A. Indian Country defined and distinguished from Indian 
lands, tribal lands, trust lands, and reservation land. 
The court of appeals' conclusion that the Ute Indian Tribe 
was the victim of defendant's unlawful hunting within Indian 
Country misapprehends several legally-significant terms crucial 
both to understanding the geographic extent of the Tribe's 
regulatory authority and to correctly resolving the 
jurisdictional question. The Reber opinion uses multiple phrases 
interchangeably to describe the extent of the Ute Tribe's 
regulatory and jurisdictional reach: "Indian Country," 
"reservation land," "tribal lands," and "Indian lands." See 
Reber, 2005 UT App 485, M 11-13. These terms are not 
synonymous. Using them synonymously led the court of appeals to 
a conclusion directly contrary to United States Supreme Court 
precedent. 
"Indian Country," a legal term of art, is an umbrella term, 
describing all territory within the exterior, historical 
boundaries of a reservation not expressly diminished by an Act of 
Congress. See Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State 
Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 359 (1962).6 This broad term 
references geography, not land ownership, and can include lands 
held in a variety of ways. For example, it can include "tribal" 
or "trust" lands, which are those lands owned and held in trust 
by the federal government for individual Indians or tribes. 
6
 The codified definition of Indian Country is found at 18 
U.S.C. § 1151, located at addendum E. 
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vxTi ibai/' or "trust" lands form a part of Indian Country, smaller 
than, and contained wi th ii n "Indian Coi intr;; / " S:i in:i ] a :i : 1 ;  *
 t ""' 11 id i ai i 
_uu111ry " can include u Indian lands,// \ /1 Iic 1 i are triba 1 or trust 
lands and lands owned by an Indian tribe or ' • :' • •  : 
fee simple. "Ii idiai i lai id" i s thus a broader term than "tribal" 
"'••-rust lands," b^c a :-a rr^ v/^ -"- term than "Indian C~u-
,i.-jr ui\\L-L-j±±]i term- i^i^n ountry, " or:n ilno : , ;.uue state-
owned lands; public l^ .-i-U own^d by th^ fpd^ral government and 
•-:.:.;•:• •.;•. . , . j r ^ a n <~.
 4 /la^agement o^ +-he 
National Forest Service; even i :i-.--:}x incorporated in towns by n o u -
:
 -Jiierican Indian -
Law, 125-33 - •;. , i.--- ii • f." ih^^e various forms of 
owners!:: o r~. . ] '- •••• ' !• j-
 3,..h ... . c ill ""Indian 
Country' as .oiig as The lands were historically within the 
exterior boundaries oi = 
t€>rm used to describe the geographic boundaries of the historic 
reservatinn, it does not, however, answ^t tlm inesf ini i n . 
has jurisdiction today over crimes committed w:::hin it. & .' 
determination that a crime was coram i tted in "Indian Coi mtry" 
me r e J y b e g i i I s 11 I < = j i I r I s di ct i o i Ia 1 ana 1 y s i s . •' • • "
 ; • :.,-.  • . . . •" • • •' -
In Reber, the parties agreed and the court found that the 
< • r 1. ni' ' h a d O C C I I i i: < M I n EL I: i C :)i n it^ witl i:i i l Ii idian . ' . 
Country. See R. 584: 19-20. No evidence was adduced that- t h e ' 
crime was r • • : Mi iii I i To t - . : •. . dvision 
of Wildlife Resources officer testified that the deer was killed 
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"just east of Bitter Creek on the Kings Well Road" in Uintah 
County. See R. 584: 164. This evidence was undisputed. 
Plotting the location on a map demonstrates that the crime was 
committed miles away from the nearest Indian lands. See addendum 
F. 
B. Montana v. United States is dispositive. 
The court of appeals in Reber held that the State could not 
assert jurisdiction because the crime victim was the Ute Indian 
Tribe. 2005 UT App 485, 1 13. The Ute Tribe, however, is not 
the victim because the Tribe lacks regulatory authority over non-
Indian hunting on non-Indian lands within Indian Country. 
The Tribe's regulatory authority over non-Indian hunting on 
non-Indian lands within Indian Country is directly addressed in 
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Indeed, the 
United States Supreme Court has characterized Montana as "the 
pathmarking case concerning tribal civil authority over 
nonmembers/' Strate v, A-l Contractors, 52 0 U.S. 4 38, 445 
(1997). Montana "concerned the authority of the Crow Tribe to 
regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on lands within the 
Tribe's reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians.''' Id. 
The case is dispositive because it addresses the interests of 
both the State and the Tribe in regulating non-Indian hunting in 
Indian Country on land that is not owned by the Tribe or a member 
of the Tribe or is not held in trust for their benefit by the 
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United. States. Montana conclusively establishes that the Ute 
Tribe cannon be the vi ctim.in this case. 
Montana, the Crow reservation, whi ch was "Indian 
Country,, " inc] uded three categories of 1 ind ownership: land hP 1 d 
i i i I!:i us t 1: > tl: le federal government i^r ti ,bal members (Indian •  
land); land held in trust by t.h^  federal government for r^e Tribe 
(11 i :I :i an 1 a j i I i , 11 n J 1 \ \ i I In IM in lee b y nun-Indians (non-Indian •; 
land). Montana, 450 i j. S. at 548. The issue presented was '...••/ 
whetl ler the Vi if'1 I'UIJM j« ijnii in iiuin i i m | i11l min Indians on the • 
non-Indian land within Indian Country, largely the bed and banks 
o f t h e Ri q H< m 11 P i v« * t , ! 11 I I M " n p i •-•mtj ' u i 11 I I n • I < I | v i b b < M I i 111 > > 
the ownership of Montana upon its admission to the Union. Id. at 
556-57. In other words, .•••IIM M , . ,rn ,. "in, . | • i M 1. ^  • •» n 'i lndi.ni 
hunting on non-Indian, state-owned land within Indian Country? 
The Supreme Court held that it cuulu -' • * * 
Indian sovereignty, various Crow treaties, emu : -••.? federal 
trespass statute, ] 8 I J.S.C § 1 ] 65i( as possible sources o\ 4> ' • 
reg u 1atory ai i 11 iori t y , Id. at 55 7. 11 I 11 Ie lat°r case of Strate 
v. A-l Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), the Supreme Court •,•,•.:••,.• 
s i ii [ n [ La r I z ed i t: s 1 Ic ] :l :ii i i• :j :i i I Moi rtai ia :. • 
Montana thus described a general rule that, 
absent a different congressional direction, 
Indian tribes lack civil authority over the 
conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land 
.'"'. within a reservation, subject to two 
exceptions: The first exception relates to 
nonmembers who enter consensual relationshi ps 
with the tribe or its members; the second 
concerns activity that directly affects the 
tribe's politd cal i ntegrity, economic •• •, 
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security, health, or welfare. The Montana 
Court recognized that the Crow Tribe retained 
power to limit or forbid hunting or fishing 
by nonmembers on land still owned by or held 
in trust for the Tribe (citation omitted). 
Id. at 446.7 
The Montana rule, that a tribe cannot regulate non-Indian 
hunting on non-Indian land within Indian Country, is dispositive 
because neither of the exceptions apply in this case. First, 
there is no evidence of a consensual agreement between the non-
Indian hunters and the Ute Tribe that would subject such hunters 
to tribal regulations governing hunting in Indian Country on non-
Indian land. Second, as in Montana, the facts of Reber do not 
suggest that non-Indian hunting on non-Indian land so implicates 
the economic security or self-government of the Tribe as to 
justify tribal regulation. 
To the contrary, here the Ute Indian Tribe filed an amicus 
brief in the court of appeals on behalf of the State's position, 
asking the court to uphold defendant's state court conviction 
based on a violation of state law. The Ute Indian Tribe itself, 
consistent with Montana, thus explicitly endorsed the State's 
regulation of and criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians hunting 
illegally on non-Indian land within Indian Country. 
7
 The same rule that applies to privately-owned fee lands 
and state-owned lands also applies to federally-owned lands. See 
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) 
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Under Montana, the Ute Tribe has no regulatory authority.' 
over non-Indian hi inti ng on 1 and 2 n Indian Country that i s not 
: r c I J t B t r i 1: a 1 membe r o r :i s n ot 1 Ie 1 d " ° •'"rust 
by the United States for the benefit of the Tri be or members of 
tl le Tr. LI"H.-1. I I L^gn I I I UI<J 11 issue h e r e w a s c o m m i t t e d 
by a non-Indian on land miles away from the nearest Indian lands, 
11 i e T i :i b e h a s i I : • r • B q i i ] a 1: o r y a I I 11: I o r j t y • :> \ s r t: 1 i a 1: a c 1: :i ;,„, :i 1: ;y a i I :i ;' •. •. 
canncj-t, therefore, be the crime victim. 
teritrai auti,. r+M... ., ,, ^ ^ w >.„>x ^-^ court of appect 
-ii-i-li' only to Inc. *~~di>, not to all of Indian Country. 
Several central authorities relied upon by the court ~f 
aopeals do rv\r support- its d^cisio- :,,or example, ' ' equating 
Mjj;-;...ii < •:^i^:. .L.-i.o.
 r ;. i'l^j com., ^t appeals 
erroneously concluded that the Utah Constitution precludes the 
S t a t e f s e x e r c i s e o f j i i r :i s d i c t i o i I a i I ^  wi I e r e w 11 h I n I nd I a n C c un t r y. 
By its plain language, however, article 111 of the Utah 
C o n s 1: :i 11 11 i :> i l a p p ] :i e s o i I ] ^  !:  • :: ] a i i :I s v" % : \ 11 I • s :i :: r 1 I • s ] d t y a r I ;y 1 n d i a n 
or Indian tribes See Reber, 2005 UI App 485, 15 (quoti ng Utah 
Const. Art. u i ) . !: :i :: ] e 111, 1: y :i t s e : i p ,1 :i c I:: 1: e r i in s , 1 1 I i i s 
applies to Indian lands, not to all of Indian Country. 
Similarly, by equating MIndian Countx ' ," 
the court of appeals erroneously relied ^n ^.i: -> -LhH apply only 
to crimes committed • ^  > ^ ur-t ^an^s. ^ e , e. * "nit d St a^es ,r, 
Fel tier, 54 6 i " Si /;[ j: - o _ '
 r aff' d 7 52 ?\ 2 i 
1505, 1507 (10th Cir. 1^.5); United States v. Von Murdock, 919 
E ' Si ipp ] 53 1 1 538 ( an- i . :._ i ,i . ' 1Cth 
•". • •• - 1 5 -
Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 810 (1998). These cases, by 
their explicit terms, do not control because they offer no 
guidance about the State's criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
on non-trust lands. 
Specifically, both Felter and Von Murdock addressed charges 
brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1165, which governs trespass on 
trust land for the purpose of hunting and fishing. See Felter, 
752 F.2d at 1506; Von Murdock, 132 F.3d at 535. By its explicit 
terms, section 1165 applies only to land owned by the federal 
government and held in trust for an Indian or Tribe. See 
Montana, 450 U.S. at 561-62. Indeed, Congress specifically 
considered incorporating the broader definition of Indian Country 
into section 1165 and then intentionally rejected the idea. Id. 
at 562. 
In Felter, the crime was committed "within Indian Country 
and upon lands in the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation held in 
trust by the United States for the Ute Indian Tribe." 752 F.2d 
at 1507 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Von Murdock, the crime 
was committed "upon land belonging to the Ute Indian Tribe and 
held in trust by the United States." 919 F. Supp. at 1538 
(emphasis in original). References to tribal lands, trust lands, 
Indian lands, and reservation lands in these two cases are thus 
limited to land owned by the Tribe and held in trust by the 
federal government. These lands are not coextensive with the 
broader geographical designation of Indian Country. 
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The Reber opinion, by failing to recognize the distinction 
between Indian Country and trust land, cites Felter ,nir| VMII 
Murdock as though the teachings of these cases applied to all nf 
Indian Country, They Hn not. They apply only to a smaller 
]:: 'Oi I::i • :>i 1 : f J <E I 11 i 11 t. ho broader designation of Indian Country. 
They apply to land that is hobi • rr- -t -v •-; a federal 
1
 - o T ..... . ..dian. For ' 
example, Reber relies directly cw Felter to assert that "the Ute 
= • ' * " :• •' ' , h e 
Ian; it governs." 200b UT App 4 ^ , 1! Tased on Felter, this 
statement , i -.t-j , 
does not stana lor r;he proposition that : ':o Tribe has a 
regulatory interest ~-.-- i 
Country -; conclusion ihdL :* .j-reculy contrar, to Montana. 
Reber also relies on Fel toy • * iirm 
uelvjLdanis^ acts ^f hunting >:<n Indian Country affected thf "to 
Tribe's regulatory interest, the tribe is the vici __._ 
i-.-b- rei. ^  i , uowever. -» +• ^ n only be accurately .stated that 
if defendants had hunted unlawfully on trust land, the Ute 
Tribe's reguh-il " u:•> inL<-j.iost in hunting would have been affected. 
Felter does ;i ;v, support the more far-reaching proposition, 
r ' •-  1 i t : f Moi it a. i la, tl la I: iny where in 
Indian Country affects the Tribe's regulatory interests. 
-1 1-
POINT TWO 
THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE DOES NOT HAVE 
A TRADITIONAL PROPERTY INTEREST IN 
WILDLIFE ON THE HOOF; LACKING SUCH 
AN INTEREST, THE TRIBE IS NOT THE 
VICTIM OF DEFENDANT'S UNLAWFUL 
POACHING 
After concluding that the Ute Tribe was the crime victim by 
virtue of its regulatory interest over all hunting in Indian 
Country, the court of appeals observed in a footnote that "[a]n 
argument might also be made that the Ute Tribe had a property 
interest in the wildlife." Reber, 2005 UT App 485, 111 n.3. 
This footnote suggests that the Ute Indian Tribe may be a victim 
for purposes of determining criminal jurisdiction because a deer 
killed anywhere in Indian Country invokes a tribal property 
interest in the wildlife. Id. This proposition is incorrect. 
The United States Supreme Court has made clear on multiple 
occasions that living, wild animals are not subject to ownership, 
in the sense of bestowing property rights on the party whose land 
a freely-roaming animal happens to occupy at any given time. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has branded the idea of owning wild 
animals as "pure fantasy": 
A State does not stand in the same position 
as the owner of a private game preserve and 
it is pure fantasy to talk of "owning" wild 
fish, birds, or animals. Neither the States 
nor the Federal Government, any more than a 
hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to 
these creatures until they are reduced to 
possession by skillful capture. . . . The 
"ownership" language [of cases cited by 
appellant] must be understood as no more than 
a 19th century legal fiction expressing "the 
-18-
importance to its people that a State have 
power to preserve and regulate the 
exploitation of an important resource." 
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977) 
(quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948)); accord 
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1979); see also Geer v. 
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1896)(overruled on other 
grounds by Hughes v. Oklahoma, supra)(reviewing nature of 
property in "animals ferae naturae" and concluding they are not 
private property but rather communal assets whose control and 
regulation are exercised "as a trust for the benefit of the 
people"); Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1335 (9th Cir. 
1988)("The federal government does not ^own' the wild animals it 
protects"); Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 
1423, 1426 (10th Cir. 1986) ("Neither state nor federal authority 
over wildlife is premised upon any technical "ownership" of 
wildlife by the government"). 
The "legal fiction" of ownership of wild animals applies 
with equal force to Indian tribes: 
The fact that fish and game are presently 
upon an Indian reservation does not negate 
the state interest in conserving them, along 
with all other fish and game within the 
boundaries of the state. A tribe cannot 
claim to "own" the fish and game on the 
reservation so as to deprive the state of any 
interest in them. 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona Dep't. of Game & Fish, 64 9 
F.2d 1274, 1283 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Douglas v. Seacoast 
Products, Inc., 431 U.S. at 284)). Because neither a state, nor 
-19-
the Federal Government, nor an Indian tribe has a property 
interest in wildlife on the hoof, none of these entities can be 
considered a victim of a hunting crime committed in Indian 
Country. 
In suggesting that the Tribe enjoys a property right in 
wildlife on the hoof, the court of appeals cites sections of the 
Ute Law and Order Code and the Utah Code, both of which purport 
to establish wildlife as the property of the respective 
governmental entities. See Reber, 2005 UT App 485, Sill n.3 
(quoting Ute Law and Order Code § 8-1-3(1); Utah Code Ann. § 23-
13-3 (West 2004)). The quoted language, however, must be 
interpreted to comport with the holdings of the United States 
Supreme Court. To this end, the language in both the tribal and 
state codes "must be understood as no more than . . . expressing 
the importance to its people that a State [or Tribe] have power 
to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important 
resource/7 Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. at 284. 
Regulation and control of the taking of wild animals thus becomes 
a function of the sovereign's police power, a way of maintaining 
the resource for the benefit of all the people. Id. Such 
regulatory authority over wildlife for the communal good does not 
equate with classifying wildlife as state-owned or tribal-owned 
property that can be bought and sold like any other property. 
Because the Tribe does not have a property interest in 
wildlife on the hoof, it cannot be the victim of defendant's 
-20-
illegal poaching. The jurisdictional analysis, therefore, 
necessarily reverts to a determination of whether defendant is 
Indian. Where, in this case, the trial court determined that 
defendant was not Indian and the court of appeals did not disturb 
that ruling, jurisdiction properly rests with the State. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should reverse the court 
of appeals' ruling that the State lacked jurisdiction because the 
Ute Indian Tribe was the victim of defendant's illegal hunting on 
non-Indian land within Indian Country. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _/\j_ day of September, 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Rickie L. REBER, Steven Paul Thunehorst, and 
Tex William Atkins, Defendants and Appellants. 
Ute Indian Tribe, Amicus Curiae. 
No. 20040371-CA. 
Nov. 10, 2005. 
Rehearing Denied March 1, 2006. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in a jury 
trial in the Eighth District, Vernal Department, A. 
Lynn Payne, J., of aiding or assisting in wanton 
destruction of protected wildlife, and two other 
defendants entered conditional guilty pleas to 
attempted wanton destruction of protected wildlife. 
Defendants appealed. 
2HoIding: The Court of Appeals, Bench, Associate 
P.J., held that state court lacked jurisdiction over 
hunting violations committed on Indian lands. 
Vacated. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law 110 €=>H34(3) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
110k 1134 Scope and Extent in General 
110k 1134(3) k. Questions Considered 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
Jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness, and appellate court accords no 
particular deference to the district court's decision. 
[2] Indians 209 €=^32.8 
209 Indians 
209k32.5 Hunting, Fishing, and Similar Rights 
209k32.8 k. Violation; Enforcement. Most 
Cited Cases 
Indians 209 €=^38(2) 
209 Indians 
209k38 Criminal Prosecutions 
209k38(2) k. Jurisdiction. Most Cited Cases 
State lacked jurisdiction over defendants charged 
with aiding or assisting in wanton destruction of 
protected wildlife and attempted wanton destruction 
of protected wildlife, as victim was Indian tribe; 
defendants shot deer in Indian Country governed by 
tribe, and tribe had regulatory interest over hunting 
and fishing on land it governed. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1151,1165. 
[3] Indians 209 €=>38(2) 
209 Indians 
209k38 Criminal Prosecutions 
209k38(2) k. Jurisdiction. Most Cited Cases 
If either the defendant or the victim is an Indian, 
then jurisdiction in a criminal case lies with the 
tribal or federal courts. 
[4] Indians 209 €==>32.6 
209 Indians 
209k32.5 Hunting, Fishing, and Similar Rights 
209k32.6 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Indians 209 €==>32.10(1) 
209 Indians 
209k32.5 Hunting, Fishing, and Similar Rights 
209k32.10 Fishing Rights 
209k32.10(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
The right to hunt and fish on reservation land is a 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
128 P.3d 1211 
128 P.3d 1211, 2005 UT App 485, 538 Utah Adv. Rep. 
(Cite as: 128 P.3d 1211) 
long-established tribal right; additionally, aside 
from the right to hunt or fish on tribal lands to the 
exclusion of others, the tribe possesses the 
discretion inherent in the police power to regulate 
and allocate the fish and game resources as it sees 
fit, within the constraints imposed by law. 
*1212 Michael L. Humiston, Heber City, for 
Appellants. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen. and Joanne C. 
Slotnik, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee. 
Kimberly D. Washburn, Draper, Tod J. Smith, 
Boulder, Colorado, and Charles L. Kaiser, Charles 
A. Breer, and Peter J. Hack, Davis, Graham & 
Stubbs, LLP, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae. 
Before BENCH, Associate P.J., DAVIS, and ORME 
,JJ. 
BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge: 
% 1 Defendant Reber appeals his conviction for 
one count of aiding or assisting in wanton 
destruction of protected wildlife, a third degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code sections 23-20-4 
and -23. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 23-20-4, -23 
(2003 & Supp.2005). Defendants Thunehorst and 
Atkins appeal their conditional pleas of attempted 
wanton destruction of protected wildlife, a class B 
misdemeanor. See id. We vacate each conviction 
for lack of state jurisdiction. 
BACKGROUND 
f 2 During the 2002 deer hunting season in Uintah 
County, Reber's son shot and killed a large mule 
deer with Reber's assistance. Later, Reber drove 
his truck through a Utah Division of Wildlife 
Resources checkpoint with the trophy buck in the 
bed of the truck. They did not have a state permit, 
license, or tag attached to the animal. The State 
charged Reber with aiding and assisting in the 
wanton destruction of wildlife. Because Reber's 
son shot a trophy buck, the crime constituted a third 
degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4(3)(a) 
. During that same hunting season, Defendant 
Atkins shot a buck in Uintah County and Defendant 
Thunehorst assisted him. They were both charged 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
with class A misdemeanors. See id. § 23-20-4(3)(b) 
1[ 3 Reber filed a motion to dismiss his case for 
lack of jurisdiction, claiming that he is an Indian 
and was hunting in Indian Country. Atkins and 
Thunehorst stipulated with the State that the district 
court's ruling on jurisdiction in Reber's case would 
apply to their respective cases. The district court 
denied Reber's motion, and the jury convicted him. 
Atkins and Thunehorst entered conditional pleas to 
class B misdemeanors. Defendants separately 
appealed, and the Atkins and Thunehorst* 1213 
appeals were consolidated with the Reber appeal. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW mi 
FN1. Defendants raise and address other 
issues not covered in this opinion. 
Because we conclude that the State did not 
have jurisdiction, we need not address the 
other issues. 
[1] | 4 Defendants assert that the State lacked 
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness, and we accord no 
particular deference to the district court's decision. 
See Skokos v. Corradini, 900 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah 
Ct.App.1995). 
ANALYSIS 
f 5 Defendants claim that the State lacked 
jurisdiction because they are Indians who exercised 
federally protected rights on Indian land. The Utah 
Constitution provides: 
The people inhabiting this State do affirm and 
declare that they forever disclaim all right and title 
to the unappropriated public lands lying within the 
boundaries hereof, and to all lands lying within said 
limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, 
and that until the title thereto shall have been 
extinguished by the United States, the same shall be 
and remain subject to the disposition of the United 
States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the 
absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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the United States. 
Utah Const, art. III. Therefore, the federal 
government has jurisdiction over Indian lands until 
the Congress of the United States relinquishes such 
right. See id. 
f 6 The State of Utah may assert "jurisdiction over 
Indians and Indian territory, country, and lands or 
any portion thereof within this state in accordance 
with the consent of the United States given by the 
Act of Congress of April 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 78-80 
(Public Law 284, 90th Congress), to the extent 
authorized by that act and this chapter." Utah Code 
Ann. § 9-9-201 (2003). Utah Code section 9-9-213 
provides for concurrent state and federal 
jurisdiction over hunting on reservations. See Utah 
Code Ann. §9-9-213 (2003). In order for section 
9-9-213 to apply, and thus allow the State to assert 
jurisdiction, certain preliminary requirements must 
be met. Pursuant to Utah Code section 9-9-202, 
[s]tate jurisdiction acquired or retroceded pursuant 
to this chapter with respect to criminal offenses or 
civil causes of action shall be applicable in Indian 
country only where the enrolled Indians residing 
within the affected area of the Indian country accept 
state jurisdiction or request its retrocession by a 
majority vote of the adult Indians voting at a special 
election held for that purpose. 
Utah Code Ann. § 9-9-202 (2003). The court in 
United States v. Felter, 752 F.2d 1505, 1508 n. 7 
(10th Cir.1985), noted that "[u]nder current law, 
Indian tribes must consent to any state assumption 
of jurisdiction over 'Indian Country.' Although 
Utah since has indicated its willingness to assume 
this jurisdiction, no Indian tribe has accepted its 
offer." Id. There is no evidence in the record that 
the Ute Tribe has held an election accepting state 
jurisdiction. Thus, section 9-9-213, granting 
concurrent jurisdiction over hunting, cannot apply. 
[2] [3] \ 1 Both parties agree that the crimes in this 
case, hunting without a state license, occurred in " 
Indian Country." "Under 18 U.S.C. § 1151, the 
Tribe and the federal government have civil and 
criminal jurisdiction over 'Indian Country.' " Ute 
Indian Tribe v. Utah 114 F.3d 1513, 1529 (10th 
Cir.1997) {Ute Tribe V ). Without the election 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim 
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mentioned above, "state jurisdiction over crimes 
committed in Indian Country is limited to criminal 
acts committed 'by non-Indians against non-Indians 
... and victimless crimes by non-Indians.' " State v. 
Valdez, 2003 UT App 60,t 4, 65 P.3d 1191 
(alteration in original) (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 
465 U.S. 463, 465 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 1161, 79 L.Ed.2d 
443 (1984)). If either the defendant or the victim is 
an Indian, then jurisdiction lies with the tribal or 
federal courts. See Valdez, 2003 UT App 60 at % 
4, 65 P.3d 1191. Because we hold that the victim in 
this case is the Ute Indian Tribe, we need not 
address whether Defendants are Indians. See id. 
f 8 "The current Uintah and Ouray Reservation is 
formed from portions of two prior *1214 
reservations, the Uintah Valley Reservation, which 
was originally inhabited by the Uintah and 
Whiteriver Bands of Ute Indians, and the 
Uncompahgre Reservation, which was originally 
inhabited by the Uncompahgre Band." United 
States v. Von Murdoch, 132 F.3d 534, 540 (10th 
Cir.1997). "In 1937, ... the three Bands joined 
together to form the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation, and adopted a constitution 
and bylaws." Id. (footnote omitted). In 1950, 
representatives from each of the Bands "signed a 
series of five tribal resolutions which completed the 
transition, which began with the constitution, from 
loosely-knit Bands to [the] unified Ute Tribe." 
Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457, 1461 (10th 
Cir.1994). The constitution specified that the 
separate Bands ceased to exist outside the Ute 
Tribe, and the Ute Tribe maintained jurisdiction 
over the reservation areas and the hunting and 
fishing rights.™2 See Von Murdoch 132 F.3d at 
541. 
FN2. The original reservation "was created 
by executive order and approved by an act 
of Congress." Timpanogos Tribe v. 
Conway, 286 F.3d 1195, 1202 (10th 
Cir.2002) (footnote omitted). The act set 
apart the Uintah Valley for "the permanent 
settlement and exclusive occupancy of 
Utah Indian tribes [and] recognized and 
guaranteed the Indian rights of the tribes 
who settled there." Id. Those rights 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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include the right to hunt. See id. (" 'As a 
general rule, Indians enjoy exclusive treaty 
rights to hunt and fish on lands reserved to 
them ....' " (citation omitted)). 
f 9 The State asserts that it was the victim in this 
case, and because the State is not an Indian, state 
courts have jurisdiction over the offense. The 
State, however, is not the victim. The State 
concedes in its brief that the crime took place "in 
Uintah County on land that was within the original 
boundaries of the Uncompahgre Reservation and is ' 
Indian Country.' " There were disputes as to 
whether the 1894 and 1897 Acts of Congress 
disestablished the Uncompahgre Reservation. See 
Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 113 F.2d 1087, 1090-93 
(10th Cir.1985) (Ute Indian Tribe III ). In Ute 
Indian Tribe III, however, the court held that the 
acts did not "disturb the ownership of the land by 
the tribal group." Id at 1092. The original 
Uncompahgre Reservation is therefore considered 
Indian Country, which falls under the Ute Tribe's 
civil and criminal jurisdiction. See Ute Indian 
Tribe V, 114 F.3d at 1530 (confirming Ute Indian 
Tribe III that the tribe and federal government 
retained jurisdiction over the Uncompahgre 
Reservation). Thus, Defendants shot the deer in 
Indian Country governed by the Ute Tribe. 
f 10 Alternatively, the State asserts that the crime 
is victimless. A victimless crime is a "[t]erm 
applied to a crime which generally involves only the 
criminal, and which has no direct victim, as in the 
crime of illegal possession of drugs." Black's Law 
Dictionary 1085 (6th ed.1991). For purposes of 
Indian law, it has been emphasized that victimless 
crimes must be "truly victimless." William C. 
Canby, Jr., American Indian Law 166 (3d ed.1998). 
"Crimes against Indian property interests are not 
victimless even though no Indian person is directly 
assaulted; Indian interests are affected and that fact 
places the crime within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the federal government." Id. 
[4] f 11 "The right to hunt and fish on reservation 
land is a long-established tribal right." United 
States v. Felter, 752 F.2d 1505, 1509 (10th 
Cir.1985). Additionally, " '[a]side from the right 
to hunt or fish on tribal lands to the exclusion of 
others, the tribe possesses the discretion inherent in 
the police power to regulate and allocate the fish 
and game resources as it sees fit, within the 
constraints imposed by law.' " Id. at 1511 (quoting 
United States v. Felter, 546 F.Supp. 1002, 1023 
(D.Utah 1982)). Thus, the Ute Tribe has a 
regulatory interest over hunting and fishing on the 
land it governs. Because Defendants' acts of 
hunting on Indian Country affected the Ute Tribe's 
regulatory interest, the tribe is the victim.™3 
FN3. An argument might also be made that 
the Ute Tribe had a property interest in the 
wildlife. In United States v. Von Murdoch, 
132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir.1997), the court 
stated that " '[t]ribal rights in property are 
owned by the tribal entity, ... including 
hunting and fishing rights.' " Id. at 538 
(quoting United States v. Felter, 546 
F.Supp. 1002, 1021 (D.Utah 1982)). In 
Utah Code section 9-9-211, our legislature 
recognized a property right, noting that 
when a person goes on an Indian 
reservation and participates in hunting 
without proper authority then all "game ... 
in the defendant's possession shall be 
forfeited to the tribe." Utah Code Ann. § 
9-9-211 (2003). Similarly, pursuant to its 
jurisdiction over the land, the Ute Tribe 
claims a property interest in the wildlife. 
Section 8-1-3(1) of the Ute Law and Order 
Code states: 
All wildlife now or hereafter within the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation, not held by 
private ownership legally acquired, and 
which for purposes of this Code shall 
include all big game animals ... are hereby 
declared to be the property of the Ute 
Indian Tribe. 
Ute Law and Order Code § 8-1-3(1); cf. 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-3 (2003) ( "All 
wildlife existing within this state, not held 
by ownership and legally acquired, is the 
property of the state."). 
*1215 f 12 In holding that the defendant in Von 
Murdoch, was not an Indian, the 10th Circuit court 
asserted jurisdiction and affirmed the conviction for 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
128 P.3d 1211 
128 P.3d 1211, 2005 UT App 485, 538 Utah Adv. Rep. 67 
(Cite as: 128 P.3d 1211) 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 1165, which prohibits hunting 
on land belonging to an Indian tribe without 
permission. See Von Murdoch, 132 F.3d 534 (10th 
Cir.1997). Likewise, in Felter, the court found that 
because the defendant no longer maintained Indian 
status, the federal court could assert jurisdiction 
rather than the tribal court. See Felter, 752 F.2d 
1505. The Felter court noted "that 18 U.S.C. § 
1165 is not applicable to tribal members who 
hunted in violation of tribal regulation. Tribal 
jurisdiction over such minor offenses remains 
exclusive." Id. at 1512 n. 11 (quoting Felter, 546 
F.Supp. at 1026). It remains clear, however, that " 
Indian tribes lack jurisdiction to try and punish 
non-Indians for criminal offenses, and [thus,] 18 
U.S.C. § 1165 was designed to fill the gap in 
enforcement powers as to non-Indians hunting or 
fishing on tribal or other Indians lands without 
tribal permission." Id. The Felter court thus 
reasoned that an Indian hunting on Indian lands is 
under tribal jurisdiction, but a non-Indian hunting 
on Indian lands is under federal jurisdiction. 
Nothing in Von Murdoch or Felter suggests that 
state courts can ever assert jurisdiction over hunting 
violations committed on Indian lands. 
CONCLUSION 
^ 13 We conclude that the crimes occurred in 
Indian Country governed by the Ute Tribe. 
Because the Ute Tribe is the victim, the State does 
not have jurisdiction. We therefore vacate the 
convictions. 
f 14 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS and 
GREGORY K. ORME, Judges. 
UtahApp.,2005. 
State v. Reber 
128 P.3d 1211, 2005 UT App 485, 538 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 67 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Not Reported in P.3d Page 1 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 3006778 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App 486 
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
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Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and ORME. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
BENCH, Presiding J. 
*1 Appellant C.R. appeals a juvenile court 
judgment of wanton destruction of protected 
wildlife, a third degree felony if committed by an 
adult, in violation of Utah Code section 23-20-4. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4 (Supp.2005). Among 
other issues, C .R. asserts that the State did not have 
jurisdiction over this case because he was hunting in 
Indian Country. "Whether the juvenile court had 
jurisdiction is a question of law which we review 
under a correction of error standard." Department 
of Human Servs. v. B.R., 2002 UT App 25,1f 6, 42 
P.3d 390 (quotations and citations omitted). 
The facts of this case are, in all relevant respects, 
identical to the facts in State v. Reber, 2005 UT 
App 485. In that case, this court held that the State 
lacked jurisdiction to prosecute a violation of 
section 23-20-4 when committed in "Indian Country. 
" See id 
As in Reber, we vacate the judgment in this case for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge, 
GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
Utah App.,2005. 
State ex rel. C.R. 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 3006778 (Utah 
App.), 2005 UT App 486 
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Addendum C 
"ATTORWEY GENERAL 
AUS 2 3 2004 
APPEALS 
FILED 
IN THB UTAH COURT OP APPEALS UTAH APPELLATE L.( v JRTC» 
— O o o n o — AUG 2 n ?m# 
i t a t e of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Rickie L. Reber 
Defendant.and Appellant 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Steven .fam. 
Detendant and Appellant. 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Tex William Atkins, 
Defendant and MTmni i^iu. 
ORDER OF 
CONSOLIDATION 
Case No. 20040371-CA 
Case No. 20040464-CA 
Case No. 20040644-CA 
Case No. 20040465-CA 
This matter is before the court on Appellants1 motion to 
consolidate appeals pursuant to Rule 3 (b) of the Utah ftules of 
Appellate Procedure. The State of Utah does not oppose 
consolidation. Each of the above-captioned criminal appeals 
originating in the Eighth District Court, Vernal Department, 
raises identical issues. The parties stipulated in the district 
court that the jurisdictional ruling in State v. Reber, Eighth 
District Court No. 021800320, would be binding in each case, and 
the court resolved jurisdiction as to each case in its Modified 
Findings of Pact and Conclusions o± Law entered on January 29, 
2004. On the basis of the foregoing, the court agrees that 
consolidation of State v. Reber, Case No. 20040371-CA," "sta£ejy\. 
Atkins, Case No. 20040465-CA and Case No. 20040645-CA," Statej^. ^  
Thunehorst, Case No. 20040464-CA and Case No. 20040644-CA is 
appropriate. Our consolidation order includes the duplicate 
appeals for Atkins and Thunehorst, which were opened following 
the entry of signed judgment and order on July 30, 2004, and the 
filing of a second notice of appeal in each case on August 2, 
2004. 
The motion to consolidate appeals also seeks consolidation 
with State v. C.R.. Case No. 20040281-CA, a juvenile appeal 
related factually to State v. Reber, Case No. 20040371-CA. 
Although the juvenile appeal has issues in common with the above 
criminal appeals, resolution of the common issues will not 
necessarily be dispositive of the juvenile appeal due to the 
existence of additional issues raised only by the juvenile 
appeal. We decline to include this appeal in the formal 
consolidation, but will consider the relationship of the appeals 
in calendaring and disposition. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to consolidate appeals 
is granted, in part, and State v. Reber, Case No. 20040371-CA, 
State v. Atkins, Case No. 20040465-CA and Case No. 20040645-CA, 
and State v Thunehorst, Case No. 20040464-CA and Case No. 
20040644-CA are consolidated for all purposes. All future 
filings shall be in Case No. 20040371-CA. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the" motion to consolidate appeals 
is denied, only insofar as it seeks consolidation of Sftate v\_ 
C.R., Case No. 2D040281-CA with the above-captioned appeals. 
Dated this day of August, 2004. 
FOR THE COURT; 
Judi(di M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
Addendum D 
FILED 
UTAH APPPLLATP cm SRTO 
.-.-^.....-JENrdHffl--SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH C u U U M I ' J 
AlTOHNbYWa JUL 2
 8 2006 
ooOoo J U L 2 i ;•.:$ 
APPEALS 
-a-be 'of""Otratrp-
Petitioner, 
v. Case No. 20060299-SC 
20040371-CA 
Rickie L. Reber, 
Tex William Atkins, and 
Steven Paul Thunehorst, 
Respondents. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
certiorari, filed on March 31, 2006 and Cross-Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari filed on May 30, 2006. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issues: 
1. Whether the Ute Indian Tribe has a regulatory interest 
and authority over hunting on all the territory within "Indian 
Country" in Uintah County and, if so, whether that interest and 
authority renders it a crime victim of illegal hunting within 
Indian Country. 
2. Whether the Ute Indian Tribe has a property interest in 
wildlife in Indian Country within Uintah County and, if so, 
whether that interest renders it a crime victim of illegal 
hunting within Indian Country. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Cross-Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari is granted as to the following issue: 
Whether the Uintah Band maintains an existence independent 
of the Ute Tribe, such that the Band retains treaty rights to 
hunt and fish within Indian Country; and whether Cross-
Petitioners demonstrated they are members of the Uintah Band 
benefitting from any rights held by that Band. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED upon the court's own motion the 
petitions in Supreme Court Case No. 20060299-SC and Supreme Court 
Case No. 20060304-SC are consolidated into Supreme Court Case No. 
20060299-SC. All future filings shall be filed under Supreme 
Court Case No. 20060299-SC 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
For The Court: 
Dated 
I hereby certify that on July 28, 2006, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or 
placed in the Interdepartmental mail service, or hand delivered 
to the parties listed below: 
JOANNE C SLOTNIK 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
KIMBERLY D WASHBURN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
405 E 12450 S STE A 
PO BOX 1432 
DRAPER UT 84020 
MICHAEL L HUMISTON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
23 W CENTER ST 
PO BOX 486 
HEBER CITY UT 80432 
TOD J SMITH 
WHITEING AND SMITH 
113 6 PEARL ST STE 2 03 
BOULDER CO 803 02 
CHARLES L. KAISER 
CHARLES A. BREER 
PETER J HACK 
DAVIS GRAHAM & STUBBS LLP 
1550 SEVENTEENTH ST STE 500 
DENVER CO 802 02 
LISA COLLINS 
COURT OF APPEALS 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 140230 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-023 0 
EIGHTH DISTRICT, VERNAL DEPT 
ATTN: CANDACE / CHERYL 
920 E HWY 40 
VERNAL UT 84078 
Dep/u/ty C l e r k 
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LII / Legal Information Institute 
U.S. Code collection 
TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 53 > § 1151 
§ 1151. Indian country defined 
Prev I Next 
How Current is This? 
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term "Indian 
country", as used in this chapter, means 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, 
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, 
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States 
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether 
within or without the limits of a state, and 
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, 
including rights-of-way running through the same. 
Search 
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Addendum G 
4. CHAET OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
IN INDIAN COUNTRY BY PARTIES 
AND CRIMES 
Notes: 
i. This chart does not reflect federal crimes 
applicable to all persons in all places, such as 
theft from the mails or treason. 
ii. This chart does not apply to Indian country-
over whicl} the state has taken jurisdiction pursu-
ant to Public Law 280,18 U.S.CA § 1162. 
Crime by Part ies 
a. Crimes by Indians 
against Indians: 
i. "Major" crimes. 
ii. Other crimes. 
b. Crimes by Indians 
against non-Indians: 
i. "Major" crimes, 
ii. Other crimes. 
c. Crimes by Indians with-
out Victims: 
d. Crimes by non-Indians 
against Indians: 
e. Crimes by non-Indians 
against non-Indians: 
f. Crimes by non-Indians 
without Victims: 
Jurisdiction 
Federal or tribal 
(concurrent) 
Tribal (exclusive) 
Federal or tribal 
(concurrent) 
Federal or tribal 
(concurrent) 
Tribal (exclusive) 
Federal (exclu-
sive) 
State (exclusive) 
State (exclusive) 
Statutory 
Authority 
18 U.S.CA § 1153 
18 U.S.CA § 1153 
18 U.S.CA § 1152 
18 U.S.CA § 1152 
Addendum H 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ~T~ ~T~ R L E D 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICKIE L. REBER, 
Defendant. 
RULING DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
SEP 0 9 2303 
JOANNE MJbKEE, CLERK 
BY V W DEPUTY 
Case No.: 021800320 
This matter came before the Court on June 3, 2003 for hearing. At the hearing the 
parties stipulated that: 
1. The Defendant's mother carried 1/8 "Indian Blood", and was named on the 
Termination Proclamation in 1961.l 
2. The Defendant's father does not have any "Indian Blood". 
3. The Defendant is 15/16 non-Indian by blood and 1/16 Indian by blood. 
4. The Defendant is not a member of any Indian Tribe recognized as a Tribe by 
the United States Government. 
5. The Defendant is 51 years old. He was born in Roosevelt and lived in 
Lapoint, Utah until he was 22. He has not lived in Indian Country since he was 22. 
6. The Defendant does not now claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos 
Tribe". 
7. The Defendant does not maintain that the permit which he produced when he 
1
 In 1954 Congress passed the Ute Termination Act, August 27, 1954, Ch 1009, 68 State 
868, which is now found at 25 U S C 677 "The Termination Proclamation, contemplated by 
Section 23 of the "Act", 25 U S C Section 677v , was issued and published by the Secretary 
effective at midnight August 27, 1961 26 Fed Reg 8042 " Affiliated Utes v United States 406 
US 128 at p 139. see also United States v Felter. 546 F Supp 1002 (Utah DC 1982), at page 
p 1006 
1 
was first contacted by law enforcement is valid. He does maintain that, at that time, he 
believed that the permit was valid. 
This Court is bound by the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Perank. 858 
P.2d 927 and Hagen v. Utah3 510 U.S. 399. Each of these cases held that the exterior 
boundaries of the Uintah Indian Reservation has been diminished and that there is no outer 
boundary to the reservation. The United States Supreme Court noted: "The operative 
language of the 1902 Act provided for allocations of reservation land to Indians, and that all 
the unallotted lands within said reservation shall be restored to the public domain", (At 
412).. ."It follows that wh&n lands so reserved were 'restored' to the public domain •• - i.e., 
once again opened to sale or settlement- - their previous public use was extinguished" (at 412). 
The Court then noted that when lands were returned to public domain, this stripped the land of 
reservation status (at p412). Finally the Court indicated that "our cases considering operative 
language of restoration have uniformly equated it with a congressional purpose to terminate 
reservation status." (at p. 413). Finally the Court held: "In light of our precedents, we hold 
that the restoration of unallotted reservation lands to the public domain evidences a 
congressional intent with respect to those lands inconsistent with the continuation of 
reservation status." 
Federal law defines Indian Country to include land within: Indian Reservations, 
dependent Indian Communities, and Indian Allotments. 18 U.S.C. 1151 (a), (b),(c). Federal 
case law also reserves jurisdiction of crimes which occur within "Indian Country" involving an 
Indian as a victim to the tribes or the Federal Government. 18 U.S.C. 1152; Duro v. Reina. 
495 U.S. 676. However, State Courts have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes which occur 
within Indian Country where the defendant and victim are not Indian. Williams v. U.S.. 327 
U.S. 711; State v. Roedl. 155 P.2d 741 (Utah 1945). Federal Statutes do not define "Indian" 
for criminal jurisdictional purposes. In United States v. Rogers. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572-
73 (1846), the United States Supreme Court suggested two factors to be evaluated in 
determining who is an Indian: (1) Whether die individual has a significant degree of Indian 
blood; and (2) Whether the individual has been recognized as an Indian by a tribe, or society 
of Indians, or by the Federal Government. The Rogers test for determining Indian status has 
been adopted by the Utah Appellate and Supreme Courts. State of Utah v. Hagen. 802 P2d 
745, 748 (Ut. App. Ct. 1990); State of Utah v. Perank. 858 P.2d 927; 932 (Ut. S. CT., 
1992). Until the Utah Supreme Court announces a new standard, this Court is bound by the 
Hagen 
2 
and Perank cases. Therefore, this Court will follow the Rogers test in determining whether 
the Defendant is an Indian. Any argument that Utah should follow the test announced in 
Lapier vs. McCormicL 986 F.2d 303 should be addressed to the Supreme Court.2 
Federal statutes do not address the issue of who has the burden to prove that a 
defendant (or victim) is an Indian or that the crime occurred in tfIndian Country". The Utah 
Appellate Court in Hagen stated: "The State properly concedes that the prosecution was 
required to prove jurisdiction, i.e., that defendant was not an Indian, albeit only by a 
preponderance of evidence." The Hagen Court cited State v. Sorenson. 758 P.2d 466, 469-
470, as authority for the proposition that the State had the burden of showing that a defendant 
was not an Indian. However, the issue in Sorenson concerned territorial rather than personal 
jurisdiction. While territorial jurisdiction must be proved by the State by a preponderance of 
evidence in every criminal case (State v. Payne, 892 P.2d 1032) personal jurisdiction is not an 
element of an offense and need not be proved as such. Moreover, the Court of Appeals has 
not been consistent in requiring the State prove an individual is not an Indian. In an 
unpublished opinion (State v. Lucero. Case No. 860213 - Ca) a different panel of the 
Appellate Court held: "...Appellant had the burden to persuade the trial Court that he was an 
'Indian' within the intended purview of 18 U.S.C. Section 1152-53." More importantly, our 
Supreme Court has indicated: "On these facts, we conclude that Perank carried his burden of 
factually establishing that he has been 'recognized racially' as a Ute Indian." Perank at 933. 
Given the fact that the Perank decision is the most recent appellate decision and that it is die 
opinion of our Supreme Court, this Court is bound to follow that decision. Therefore, 
although the State bears the burden of showing that the offense occurred within the boundaries 
of the State of Utah and Uintah County, the defendant has the burden to show, by a 
2Some have argued that Indian status, for the purposes of determining Federal jurisdiction 
under Section 1152 and 1153 should be based entirely upon membership in a Federally 
recognized Indian Tribe. This test would allow Indians to make their own determination of 
"Indian" status. Reliance upon tribal membership would also provide an understandable and 
workable standard. It would avoid consideration of such subjective and transitory issues as self-
concept as being Indian and recognition as being Indian within Indian Society. It further avoids 
the quagmire encountered in making a determination of "Indian" status based upon Federal 
recognition. Federal Statutes and Regulations which define "Indian" are inconsistent and 
confusing. Individuals are defined as "Indian" for some purposes and programs, but are not 
defined as "Indian" for other purposes and programs. Where an individual comes within some, 
but not all, federal definitions, where does the Court draw the line in determining "Indian" status. 
Is it sufficient if an individual meets at least one federal definition; or must he be recognized 
within "most" definitions; or perhaps he must meet all federal definitions of "Indian". A 
definition of "Indian" for the purpose of applying section 1152 which relies upon membership in 
a Federally recognized Indian tribe provide a much more workable standard than the test set forth 
in Hagen Nevertheless, most courts who have considered this issue have adopted the Hagen 
test. 
3 
preponderance of evidence, that he is an "Indian" under the Rogers test. 
Placing the burden on the defendant is consistent with what two Courts have 
characterized as the majority position of courts which have addressed the issue. Arizona v. 
Verdugo. 901 P.2d 1165, 1168 (1995 Ariz. App. Ct); Vermont v. St. Francis. 563 A.2d 249. 
This is consistent with case law in: Arizona (Verdugo): Vermont (St. Francis): New Mexico 
(State of New Mexico v. Cutnose. 532 P.2d 896, (N.M. App. 1974)); Nevada (State of 
Nevada v. Jack. 96 P.497 (1908)); Pendleton v. Sate of Nevada 734 P.2d 693 (1987); 
Oklahoma (State of Oklahoma v. Klindt. 782 P.2d 401, (Okla. Crim. App. 1989); Washington 
(State of Washington v. Daniels. 16 P.3d 650) and with sound public policy, "...the general 
rule is that the State has subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute crimes within its territorial 
border. ...As an exception to that general rule, however, the Indian Country Crimes Act 
preempts State Court jurisdiction over a criminal prosecution when an offense involving an 
Indian occurs on Indian land...The federal statute is silent, however, on the issue of who bears 
the burden of proof to establish these jurisdictional facts." Verdugo at 1167. The Arizona 
Appellate Court then noted that while the State bears the burden to show the offense occurred 
within State boundaries, the elements of a criminal offense do not require the State to prove 
that the crime did not involve an Indian. The Court notes that to require the State to prove 
that the defendant and the victim were not Indian would place ,f... the state... in a position of 
having to prove the nonoccurence of events which might deprive it of jurisdiction." (Verdugo 
at 1168). The court went on to note: "If we were to place this burden on the state, the state 
would be compelled to allege...every conceivable exception to State Court jurisdiction." 
(Verdugo at 1168). Not only would the state be required to allege every exception to 
jurisdiction, the state would have the affirmative burden to prove that die exception did not 
apply. 
Wigmore suggest that in determining \yho should bear the burden of proof it is 
appropriate to consider that it is difficult to prove the nonexistence of a fact and it is 
appropriate to place the burden on the party who presumably has particular means of 
knowledge.) Wigmore. Evidence in Trials at Common Law §2486 (1981). It is therefore 
relevant that there are over three hundred Indian Tribes which have been recognized by the 
Federal Government. Membership in any one of these tribes would be sufficient to meet the 
second test as set forth in Rogers (i.e. that the individual has been recognized as an Indian by a 
tribe, or society of Indians, or by the Federal Government). In addition to Federally 
recognized tribes there are many more Indian groups or societies of Indians which may form 
the basis to establish the second test in Rogers. It would therefore be virtually impossible for 
the state to prove that a particular individual was not a member of any of the possible tribes 
and Indian societies throughout the United States. Additionally, in many cases it would be 
impossible to prove that a particular person did not have a significant degree of Indian blood 
(which is the first test under Rogers). While it may be possible to determine the identity of a 
defendant's parents it may be impossible to prove that the parents do not have Indian blood. 
In the case of adopted persons, it would often be impossible to determine that the biological 
parents were not Indian. This becomes even more difficult as you consider whether 
4 
grandparents and great grandparents (who may be deceased) have Indian blood. All of this is 
complicated by the liberal interpretation courts have given to the term significant degree of 
Indian blood. Generally twenty-five percent is considered substantial. It is obvious that, the 
information which is relevant to a defendant's blood lines as well as his or her associations 
with Indian Tribes and societies, is uniquely within the knowledge of the Defendant and is 
usually readily available to the Defendant, while such information is often unavailable to the 
State. 
One must also remember that under 1151 the state is deprived of jurisdiction when a 
victim is an Indian. If the state bears the burden of proof, the state must show that each victim 
in every case is not an Indian. In most cases this could be easily accomplished by asking the 
victim a few simple questions during trial. However, not all victims are available to be 
examined at trial. Victims move and sometimes can not be located. Victims may die prior to 
trial. By definition, a victim in a homicide would never be available to testify concerning their 
blood lines or association with Indian Tribes and societies. Because Indian status may depend 
on association with Indian tribes, culture, and society, it would often be difficult to prove that 
a victim who is not present at trial was not an Indian. Occasionally, it is not possible for the 
State to even identify the victim by name. (One of the cases cited above (Jack) involved a 
victim of a homicide who was "commonly known by the name 'Lotta', whose real name was 
to the grand jury unknown," (P 497). If the State were required to prove that it has 
jurisdiction by disproving Indian status of each victim, there would be certain cases where the 
victim's status as an non-Indian could never be proved. By placing the burden on the State, 
this Court would be depriving the State of jurisdiction merely because the State has no access 
to the kind of information necessary to prove Indian status under Rogers. 
Considering all of the circumstances and public policy the burden is properly placed 
upon the defendant to show an exception to state jurisdiction by establishing a preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendant or victim has a significant degree of Indian blood and has 
been recognized as an Indian by an Indian Tribe, or society of Indians, or by the Federal 
Government. * 
DATED this J day of ftme, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
ISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
5 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the. .day of ./lyJrt/wN&N/^ 2003, true and correct 
copies of the Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Mr. Edwin T. 
Peterson, Deputy Uintali County Attorney, at 152 E. 100 N., Vernal, UT 84078 and to Mr. 
Michael L. Humiston, Attorney for Defendant, at 23 W. Center Street, P.O. Box 486, Heber 
City, UT 84032. 
\lh™l$~\iAmk 
puty Clerk 
6 
Addendum I 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICKIE L. REBER, 
Defendant. 
MODIFIED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 021800320 
Judge A. Lynn Payne 
The Court, having previously entered written findings on this matter, adopts those 
findings herein and makes further findings of fact and conclusions of law, based upon the 
stipulations of the parties as follows: 
Defendant Rickie L. Reber is charged with "aiding or assisting in the wanton 
destruction of protected wildlife", a third degree felony, for allegedly assisting his 
son in taking a trophy buck deer without the appropriate permit from the area 
known as the "Book Cliffs" in southern Uintah County. Mr. Reber initially 
moved to dismiss the criminal charges claiming to be a member of the 
"Timpanogos Tribe" of Indians and that the area the alleged act occurred was in 
"Indian Country5. Mr. Reber, in the course of the litigation, abandoned his 
claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe", affirmatively alleging that he is 
a member of the "Uintah Band", and is of either Shoshone or Ute decent. 
Defendant Steven Paul Thunehorst is charged with "aiding or assisting in the 
wanton destruction of protected wildlife", a class "A" misdemeanor, for allegedly 
assisting or taking a buck deer without the appropriate permit from the area 
known as the "White Rocks Canyon" in the National Forest in Northwestern 
Uintah County. Mr. Thunehorst initially moved to dismiss the criminal charges 
claiming to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe" of Indians and that the area 
the alleged act occurred was in "Indian Country'. Mr. Thunehorst, in the course 
of the litigation, abandoned his claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos 
Tribe", affirmatively alleging that he is a member of the "Uintah Band", and is of 
either Shoshone or Ute decent. 
3. Defendant Tex William Atkins is charged with "aiding or assisting in the wanton 
destruction of protected wildlife", a class "A" misdemeanor, for allegedly 
assisting or taking a buck deer without the appropriate permit from the area 
known as the "White Rocks Canyon" in the National Forest in Northwestern 
Uintah County. Mr. Atkins initially moved to dismiss the criminal charges 
claiming to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe" of Indians and that the area 
the alleged act occurred was in "Indian Country'. Mr. Atkins, in the course of the 
litigation, abandoned his claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe", 
affirmatively alleging that he is a member of the "Uintah Band", and is of either 
Shoshone or Ute decent. 
4 With respect to Mr. Reber, it was stipulated by the parties that he claimed to be 
l/16th Indian by blood, from his mother. With respect to Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. 
Atkins it was stipulated by the parties that they claim to be 1/16th Indian by 
blood, from their grandmother. Mr. Reber's mother, and the grandmother of Mr. 
Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins, were listed on the termination proclamation. Their 
status as Indians was therefore terminated by the Ute Partition act of 1954, 25 
U.S.C. sec 677 et seq. (Hereinafter the "UPA). Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins 
may have a grandparent who had Indian blood but was not a member of a tribe 
which was recognized by the United States Dept of Interior, Bureau of Indian 
Affairs as an Indian entity, and eligible to receive services from the Bureau of 
Indian affairs by virtue of their status as Indian tribe. Mr. Thunehorst and Mr. 
Atkins have not produced evidence of the heritage of this person. 
5 Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins are not members of any Indian tribe 
recognized by the United States Dept of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs as an 
Indian entity, and eligible to receive services from the Bureau of Indian affairs by 
virtue of their status as Indian tribe. 
6 Mr. Reber is 51 years old, or was at the time of this Courts last ruling. 
7 Mr. Reber was born in Roosevelt Utah and lived in Lapoint Utah until he was 22. 
8 Mr. Reber has not lived on or near the Ute Indian Reservation since he was 22. 
9 Mr. Reber does not now claim to be a member of the Timpanogos tribe. 
10 Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunehorst, and Mr. Atkins do not now maintain that the permit 
that they produced when they were contacted by law enforcement was valid, but 
do maintain that they believed that the permit was valid at that time of the alleged 
violations. 
11. Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunehorst, and Mr. Atkins claim to be members of the "Uintah 
Band", and that is the only group that they claim to be associated with. 
They all maintain that they are Indians of Utah Territory. They do not claim to be 
members of the Ute Indian Tribe, or of the Uintah band of the Ute Indian tribe 
which is one of the three constituent bands which comprise the Ute Indian Tribe. 
12. Mr. Reber was alive in 1961. Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins were born after 
1961, however Mr. Thunehorst's and Mr. Atkin's mothers, who were sisters, were 
alive at the time of the termination proclamation in 1961. 
The Court makes the following conclusions of law. 
With respect to Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins, even if the court were to not 
consider the issue of the UP A, 25 U.S.C. §§ 677 etseq., they do not have significant blood 
quantum under the first prong of the two part analysis stated in United States v. Rogers. 45 U.S. 
(4 How.) 567, 572-73 (1846), which was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in State v Perank, 
858 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1992) to be considered an Indian. The Court can find no benefit which 
is available base upon Indian blood quantum of 1/16th. Therefore for the purpose of qualifying 
for Federal programs or recognition they do not qualify based upon their quantum of blood. 
When describing a person as having 1/16 Indian Blood one must realize that necessarily means 
that same person is 15/16 non Indian. That means that he has 6 1/4% Indian blood and 
93 3/4 non Indian blood. This percentage of blood is simply not high enough to meet the first 
prong of the Rogers Test. The Court has found no Federal or State case which determined a 
percentage of Indian blood as low as 6.25 % to be significant under the Rogers Test. There is 
judicial precedence, Vialpando vs Wyoming. 640 P.2d 77, that 12 Vi % was not substantial 
under the Rogers Test. Other case have held that 12 Vi % is substantial. This Court is unaware 
of any case which has gone below 12 l/2 %. The case that held 12 Vi % was substantial is Sully 
ys. United States 195 Fed. 2d. 113 which was issued by the 8th Circuit and is an old case. 
Even if Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkin's blood quantum was of a significant 
amount, the Court finds that the UPA terminated their status as an Indian for the purpose of 
criminal jurisdiction. Congress has the plenary power to legislate for Indian tribes in all matters. 
An individuals status as Indian for jurisdictional purposes is subject to the power of Congress to 
allocate jurisdiction between the State, Tribes, and the Federal Government. Congress clearly has 
the unilateral power to grant the State jurisdictions over persons who are Indian.. The statute in 
this case (Ute Partition Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 677 et seq.) says that upon termination, all statutes of 
the United States which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no longer be 
applicable to such member over which supervision was terminated and the laws of the several 
States shall apply to such member in the same manner as they apply to other citizens within their 
jurisdiction. That provision clearly grants to the State jurisdiction over all persons who are listed 
in the termination proclamation which would include Mr. Reber's mother and Mr. Thunhorst and 
Mr. Atkins5 grandmother. Therefore, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, Mr. Reber's 
Mother and Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins grandmother are no longer considered to be Indian. 
The natural consequence of termination of these ancestors as Indian is that each of the 
Defendant's would not be considered to have received any Indian blood from, in Mr. Reber's 
case, his mother and in Mr Atkins and Mr. Thunhorst case, their grandmother. 
The Court does not believe that Congress intended to terminate an ancestors status as 
Indian only to continue that relationship with their decedents. 
For the purpose of determining jurisdiction under Rogers Mr. Reber, does not have any 
Indian blood coming through his mother and since this is the only Indian blood which he claims, 
he does not have any Indian blood for the purposes of the Rogers analysis. As for Mr. Thunhorst 
and Mr. Atkins they also have no Indian blood coming from their maternal grandmother. The 
conclusion of this Court is based upon the conclusions of the Federal Court in the Felter case. 
U.S. vOrranaB. Felter. 546 F.Supp. 1002 (D.C. 1982), affd752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir 1985) and 
the Utah Appellate Court in the Gardner case State v. Gardner. 827 P. 2d 980 (Utah App. 
1992).. 
Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins argue that in spite of the termination of their 
ancestors Indian status, they have not been affected by the UPA; because in Mr. Rebers case he, 
and in Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins' case their mother was alive at the time of the UPA. The 
absence of the Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins' mother's name, or in Mr. Rebers case his name 
on the termination proclamation is not relevant to this inquiry. It only reflects that at the time of 
the termination act, Mr. Reber and the mothers of Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins, were not 
enrolled members of the Ute Tribe, and therefore could not be an individual who could receive 
tribal benefits. Because these individuals were not tribal members they could not have been 
listed on the termination proclamation. Nevertheless, their immediate ancestors were members 
of the tribe whose Indian Status was terminated. 
It is clear to the Court that by 1950 all relevant Indian hunting and fishing rights were 
vested in the Ute Indian tribe. No individual had a right to those hunting and fishing rights 
except through the tribe, and through membership in the tribe. Again it is evident to the Court 
that Congress did not intend to terminate Mr. Reber's mothers status as and Indian and Mr. 
Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins grandmother's status as an Indian, only to recognize their children and 
grandchildren to have Indian hunting rights based upon Indian heritage which was 
Congressionally terminated. The argument that they were not among the 490 individuals listed in 
the UPA is therefore without merit. One is either a member or not. Whether or not they were 
eligible to be an individual who was entitled to membership is not the issue. Before this Court 
can take note of any privilege which is based upon tribal membership, that person must apply for 
and be granted membership by the tribe. There is no evidence in this case that Mr. Reber, Mr. 
Thunhorst or Mr. Atkins have ever applied for or been granted membership by the Ute Indian 
Tribe. And there is no indication that Mr. Thunhorst, Mr. Reber or Mr. Atkins has been granted 
any other tribal membership. 
It would be inappropriate for the Court to extend any privilege which is available only 
through membership when the tribe has never granted those privileges through membership. 
Even if a Defendant may have once been eligible for membership that would not be relevant 
You either are a tribal member or you're not. If you are eligible you need to apply and be granted 
those privileges. The Court was further convinced after reading Judge Jenkins opinion in Felter 
which was the basis for the Murdoch decision, U.Sv. Murdoch. 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir 1997), 
that there is a connection. The Court finds that all of those rights are vested in the Tribe. A 
members interest in that tribal property is personal and cannot be transferred or inherited. It is 
true that those 490 persons who were terminated under the UPA continue to have hunting and 
fishing rights it is not true that their heirs would continue to claim any interest in tribal property 
in their own right if they were not given the privileges of tribal membership. The rights of the 
terminated Utes to hunt and fish was not their personal property right and would be extinguished 
with their death and is not transferable or inheritable. The children of persons listed on the 
Termination Proclamation are not entitled through their parents to enjoy hunting and fishing 
privileges. There was a foot note I think from the Murdoch case, citing Judge Jenkins opinion in 
the Felter case, and I'm going to paraphrase that. In essence he said, those who are terminated 
Utes are readily identified and that their rights can be ascertained and that attrition would 
eventually extinguish the rights that they have because those rights are not inheritable or 
transferable and ultimately those rights would end. 
The Court finds that Mr Reber does not have, independent of the Termination Act, 
sufficient blood quantum to qualify for an Indian under the Rogers Test. I believe for purposes 
considering the Termination Act considering the Rogers Test he has no Indian blood. Mr. Reber 
does not and can not have any hunting or fishing rights that come through his mother, because 
they have been terminated and they are not transferable even though he was alive at the time of 
the Termination Act. Mr. Reber rights must be connected to the tribe who were the ones who 
had the hunting and fishing rights. With respect to Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins the Court 
will not consider, for purpose of analysis, the Indian blood coming through their Maternal 
Grandmother. The same analysis will apply with respect to whether or not they receive any 
hunting or fishing rights from their Maternal Grandmother. Because the Court has found that no 
Defendant has sufficient blood quantum to satisfy the first prong of the Rodgers decision the 
Court need not inquire as to the second. 
All Motions with respect to claims that the Court does not have jurisdiction which are 
based upon claims that the defendants are Indians are denied. The Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the criminal cases which have been filed. 
Dated this 3 7 day of 3 ^ ^ ^ ^ 2 0 0 4 
BY THE COURT: 
A. Lynn 
Eighth District Court Judge 
Paynep 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I do hereby certify that I delivered by US Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MODIFIED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Michael L. 
Humiston Attorney for Defendant, 23 West Center Street P.O. Box 486 Heber City, Utah 84032, 
on this ~Z?^ day of January, 2004. 
